> ## Documentation Index
> Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.crossmint.com/llms.txt
> Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.

# Signer Security

> How to store and scope the secrets behind your wallet signers so a leaked key cannot drain your wallets

A signer is a cryptographic identity authorized to approve actions on a Crossmint wallet. Possession of the secret is the whole proof — the wallet checks the key, not intent. Signer security is therefore about two decisions: where the secret lives and how much authority it carries.

> [!WARNING]
>
> A leaked signer secret can be used to drain a wallet without going through Crossmint at all — the attacker signs directly against the wallet's contract. Protecting signer secrets is your responsibility as a wallet operator.

## Best Practices by Signer Type

Each signer type is secured differently. Apply the practices that match the signers your wallets use.

### Device Signer and Passkey

The private key lives in a hardware-backed keystore and cannot be extracted — but it still signs whatever payload reaches it.

* A passkey requires biometrics or a device PIN on every transaction — prefer it where silent signing is unacceptable.
* For device signers, recommend that users enable biometric authentication so no signature happens silently.
* Keep your dependencies clean. A compromised dependency or an injected script in your frontend can replace the transaction payload in memory before it reaches the keystore — pin and audit your dependencies, and use a supply-chain security layer such as [Chainguard](https://www.chainguard.dev).

### Server Signer

The keypair is derived locally from a single secret — whoever holds that secret holds the signer and can sign directly against the wallet, bypassing your backend and Crossmint entirely.

* Treat the derivation secret as the signer itself. Store it in a secrets manager or behind dedicated key management (a cloud KMS provider, an MPC/HSM-backed service) — never in application configuration, git, CI logs, or client-side code, including framework public environment variables (`NEXT_PUBLIC_`, `EXPO_PUBLIC_`, and similar prefixes). Treat any secret that has ever appeared in a repository or build artifact as compromised.
* Grant read access only to the service or process that signs.
* If your backend signs routine operations, register the server signer as a [scoped](https://docs.crossmint.com/wallets/guides/signers/scopes.md) operational signer and keep the recovery method a separate key (for example Cloud KMS or a quorum). A server signer used as the recovery method cannot be scoped.

### Cloud KMS Signer

Nobody can read the key, but KMS signs any payload sent by an identity allowed to use it — a leaked cloud credential or over-privileged IAM role is enough.

* Grant only the sign permission (for example `roles/cloudkms.signerVerifier` or `kms:Sign`) to the single service that signs.
* Require IAM authentication on the signing function.
* Alert on the cloud audit log for every signing call.
* For sensitive operations — or when the key backs a recovery method — require an explicit human approval before signing.
* If the provider supports it, keep signing permissions disabled and enable them only when an operation needs them.
* If access is abused, revoke the IAM permission. Signing stops immediately, without a signer change on the wallet.

### Email and Phone OTP

Takeover of the user's email account or phone number (SIM swap) gives an attacker the one-time code — and a single recovery method is enough to approve signer changes. Prevention lives in the user's own accounts. Encourage your users to enable:

* MFA on their email account.
* A carrier PIN or port-out lock on their phone number.
* Two-step verification in WhatsApp, if you deliver OTP through [WhatsApp](https://docs.crossmint.com/wallets/guides/recovery/whatsapp-sender.md).

### External Wallet

The key's safety depends on its holder — whether that is a user's wallet app or a backend keypair on a server.

* Never hold an external wallet's private key on your server. If you need a key your backend operates, use a [server signer](https://docs.crossmint.com/wallets/guides/signers/server-signer.md) instead.
* For client-side integrations, use established, audited web3 wallet providers — a compromised or unvetted provider can get the user to sign a tampered payload.

### Quorum Signer

The strongest option when configured correctly — an attacker must compromise `threshold` members.

* Do not register a recovery method next to the quorum unless it is held at least as securely as the quorum itself — that method can change signers on its own, without any quorum member.
* Choose independent members — different people and different signer types. Two members held by one person or one server count as one.
* Raise the threshold together with the member count. Adding members at the same threshold adds more ways to reach it.

## Operational Checklist

* **Evaluate scoped signers.** If your backend or an agent signs routine transactions, check whether a [scoped signer](https://docs.crossmint.com/wallets/guides/signers/scopes.md) fits your use case. Scopes limit the tokens, amounts, recipients, and lifetime of a signer, so a leaked key can only move what the scope allows.
* **Monitor wallet activity.** Subscribe to [webhooks](https://docs.crossmint.com/wallets/guides/webhooks.md) for `wallets.transfer.in`, `wallets.transfer.out`, and `wallets.signer.exported`, and alert on events your application did not initiate. Webhooks do not cover signer or recovery-method changes, or native-token transfers on EVM — cover those by comparing [listed signers](https://docs.crossmint.com/wallets/guides/signers/list-signers.md) against your expected configuration and watching native balances through your chain infrastructure or an address-monitoring service.
* **Review registered signers regularly.** [List the signers](https://docs.crossmint.com/wallets/guides/signers/list-signers.md) on your wallets and remove any that are no longer in use — every leftover signer is a live attack path.
* **Keep an incident contact path.** Know how to reach your team, and Crossmint support, before an incident: [contact Crossmint](https://www.crossmint.com/contact/sales).

## Protect API Keys

An API key authorizes calls to Crossmint — it is not a signer and cannot approve a wallet action on wallets that hold a separate signer secret. It still deserves protection: a leaked server-side key can read user and wallet data (emails, phone numbers, balances), which is a ready list of targets for a targeted attack. Restrict [client-side keys](https://docs.crossmint.com/introduction/platform/api-keys/client-side.md) to your authorized origins, and enable only the [scopes](https://docs.crossmint.com/introduction/platform/api-keys/scopes.md) each key needs.

> [!NOTE]
>
> Signer authority is enforced by the wallet's contract — a leaked API key cannot sign on wallets with a separate signer secret, though it can expose the user data behind a targeted attack. Keep signer secrets in dedicated storage, keep them off the client, scope what you can, and harden the accounts behind OTP-based signers.

## See Also

> [card] [Signers](https://docs.crossmint.com/wallets/concepts/signers.md)
>
> Signer types, roles, and recommended configurations

> [card] [Custody Models](https://docs.crossmint.com/wallets/concepts/custody-models.md)
>
> How signer choices map to custodial, non-custodial, and hybrid models

> [card] [Recovery Methods](https://docs.crossmint.com/wallets/concepts/recovery.md)
>
> How recovery methods restore access and approve signer changes

> [card] [Restrict a Signer with Scopes](https://docs.crossmint.com/wallets/guides/signers/scopes.md)
>
> Set spending limits, recipient whitelists, and expiry on signers
